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RoYER 1.1. UARTER

[L. A. No. 21857. In Bank. July 10, 1951.J

MARY C. ROYER, Respondent, v. HELENA
Appellant.

CAR~ER.

[1] Vendor and Purchaser-Performance of CO!ltract-AbilitJ to
Convey.-In an action for breach of a contract to purchase fl!al
propl!rty, defendant cannot successfully urge that hecausl! a
policy of title insurance was not issued plaintill failed to prove
that she was able to convey the property in accord with the
terms of the contract, where plaintiff deposited all the necessary papers in escrow and there is substantial evidence that
a policy of title insurance could and would have been issued had
defendant not repudiated the contract.
[2] Id.-Forfeiture of Purchaser'S Interest-Vendor's Option or
Right of Election.-On the 'len dee's breach of a contract to
purchase real property, the vendor has the right to retain the
down payment as a set-otl against her &etual dlim,es, independently of any right she may have under a clause in the
contract giving her the option to retain the down payment
as consideration for the execution of the contract.
[3] Id.-Forfeiture of Purchaser'S Interest-Vendor's OptioOl or
Right of Election.-In an action forbreach of a .contract for
the purchase of real' property, the
is justified in finding
that plaintiff retained the down payment to apply on the
damages sustail.led on account of the breach, where she informed defendant of her intent to hold defendant for actual
damages, and her conduct was not inconsistent with the election
of that remedy in preference to the option provided in the
contr8~t to retain the down payment as consideration for the
execution of the agreement.
U] Id.-Mistake-Burden of Proof.-In an action for breach of
a contract to purchase real property, the burden is on defendant to prove her affirmative defense that she entered the
contract under the mistaken belief that a clause giving plaintill the option to retain the down payment would limit her
liability to the amount of the down payment and that plaintiff
knew of the mistake on her part (Code Civ. Proe., § 1981).
[5] Icl.-Mistake-Findings and Conclusions.-In an action for
breach of a contract to purchase real property, the court may
reasonably conclude that defendant did not enter into the

court

McK. Dig. References: [1] Vendor and Purchaser, § 152;
[2, 3] Vendor and Purchaser, § 131; [4) Vendor and Purchaser,
§ 57; [5) Vendor and Purchaser, § 58; lG-12] Vendor and Purchaser, § 307.
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contract under the mistaken belief that a clause giving plaintiff the option to retain the down payment also limited
defendant's liability, where the clause did not purport to
limit her liability, and where her testimony as to her concern
over her liability if she could not complete performance of
the contract indicates that she knew that one who entera
into a contract may be liable in damages for its breach.
[6] Id.-Vendor'a Remedies-Damagea.-In an action for breach
of a contract to purchase real property, the court's computation of damages based on a resale price three months after
defendant's breach is erroneous, where it fails to make adjustment for an admitted decline in the market during that period.
[7] Id.-Vendor's Bemedies-Damages.-In an action for breach·
of a contract to purchase real property, the value of the property to the seller is to be determined as of the date of the
breach.
[8] Id.-Vendor's Bemedies-Damages.-Civ. Code, § 3353, has no
application in the computation of damages in an action for
breach of a contract to purchase real property.
[9] ld.-Vendor's Bemedies-Damagea.-The measure of damages
under Civ. Code, § 3307, is designed to assure to the vendor of
rea) property the benefit of his bargain, and additional
damages should not be allowed for expenses that would have
been ;,pcurred had the contract been performed. (Civ. Code,
§ 3358.)
[10] Id.-Vendor's Bemedies-Damages.-When, as a natural consequence of the vendee's breach, the vendor of real property
must lDcur additional expenses in order to realize the benefit
of his bargain, such additional expenses may be recovered in
addition to the damages provided for in Civ. Code, § 3307.
(Disapproving contrary expressions in Morgan v. Dabble, 43
Cal.App. 116, 184 P. 704, and Maloney v. Houston, 51 Cal.
App. 585, 197 P. 661.)
[11] Id.-Vendor'a Bemedies-Dama.ges.~In an action for breach
of a contract to purchase real property, by virtue of which
breach plaintiff's liability for a commission under her brokerage agreement was reduced, the court, in computing the additional damages caused by defendant's breach, should allow
an amount equal to the difference between the cost of selling
the property at its value at the time of the breach and the
amount by which the anticipated expenses of the first sale
were reduced by defendant's breach.
[7] Measure of damages for purchaser's breach of contract to
buy real property, note, 52 A.L.B. 1511. See, also, 25 CalJur. 716;
55 Am.Jur. 918.
J'l C-acl-li
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(12] Id. - Vendor's "'Remedies - Damages. - In fixing the damages
for the breach of a contract for the sale of real property, the
court should make a deduction for the value of personal
property agreed to be sold with the realty in the first sale but
not included in the second.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Orlando H. Rhodes, Judge. Judgment for
plaintiff reversed with directions.
Action for damages for breach of contract to purchase
real property. Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions.
Oliver B. Schwab and Arthur Livingston for Appellant.
Kenneth D. Holland for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant has appealed fJ;:pm a judgment
for damages for breach of a contract to purchase real property. On August 23, 1948, defendant agreed to buy plaintiff's house and lot for $24,000 and paid $1,000 down. Because she was unable to secure the additional funds necessary
to complete the purchase, defendant defaulted on the contract,
and plaintiff put the property back on the market late in
September. The following December plaintiff was able to
resell the property for $18,500. The trial court awarded
damages equal to the difference between the contract price
and the price at which the property was resold plus the expenses incurred in connection with the first sale, but less the
amount of the down payment.
[1] Defendant contends that because a policy of title
insurance was not issued, plaintiff failed to prove that she
was able to convey the property in accord with the terms of
the contract. There is no merit in this contention. Plaintiff
deposited all the necessary papers in escrow, and there is
substantial evidence that a policy of title insurance could
and would have been issued had defendant not repudiated
the contract.
[2] The contract provided "That should the purchaser
fail to pay the balance of the purchase price, or fail to complete the purchase, as herein provided, the amounts paid
hereon may, at the option of the seller, be retained a.<; the
20nsideration for the execution of this agreement by the
seller." Defendant contends that under this provision plaia-

)
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tiff had an option to retain the down payment instead of
suing for damages and that she exercised this option by retaining the deposit. The retention of the deposit was not,
however, inconsistent with plaintiff's right to elect to hold
defendant responsible for damages. Independently of any
rights she may have had under the option clause itself (see
Civ. Code, §§ 1670, 1671; Freedman v. The Rector, etc. of St.
Matthias Parish, ante, p. 16 [230 P.2d 629]), plaintiff had
the alternative right to retain the down payment as a setoff
against her actual damages. (Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Ca1.2d 36,
40 [216 P.2d 13].) Her retention of the money was consistent
[3] Since she informed
with the choice of either remedy.
defendant of her intention to hold defendant liable for aetual
damages, if the latter did not perform the contract, and since
her conduct was not inconsistent with the election of that
remedy, the trial court was justified in finding that the "deposit was retained by her to apply on damages sustained by
reason of defendant's breach of contract."
As an affirmative defense defendant pleaded that she entered
the contract under the mistaken belief that the clause giving
plaintiff the option to retain the down payment would limit
her liability to the amount of the down payment and that
plaintiff knew of this mistake on her part. The sale was negotiated through the joint efforts of Mrs. Ries, a real estate
broker to whom plaintiff had given an exclusive listing, and
Mr. Medica, a real estate agent who worked for another broker.
Defendant had sought Mr. Medica's assistance in locating an
apartment, but he succeeded in interesting her in buying plaintiff's property instead. After visiting the property she returned to Mr. Medica's office and discussed with him the possibility of its purchase. On conflicting evidence the trial court
found that Mr. Mediea had pointed out the clause giving the
seller the option to retain the down payment and "stated to
defendant that in his opinion if she did not complete the purchase of said real property she would only lose .the $1,000
deposit she was to put up." The trial court also found, however, that "said statement of Mr. Medica's was not relied
upon by defendant and did not furnish any inducement for
her to enter into said contract," and that it Wt.S not true that
"Defendant mistakenly believed that the purchase agreement
that she entered into and the contract as reduct'd to writing
provided and meant that the deposit could be retllined by the
seller but that such a forfeiture was the full ex~nt of the
defendant's obligation thereunder."
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[4] It is unnecessary to consider defendant's contention
that Mr. Medica was plaintiff's subagent whose knowledge
was imputable to plaintiff, for in any event the burden Was
upon defendant to prove that she was mistaken as to the
meaning of the contract (Code Civ. Proc., § 1981), and the
trial court was not required to find in accord with her testimony on this issue. (Hutk v. Katz, 30 Ca1.2d 605, 609 [184
P.2d 521] ; Blank v. Coffin, 20 Ca1.2d 457, 461-462 [126 P.2d
868].) [5] Moreover, the clause giving plaintiff an option
to retain the down payment as consideration for the execution
of the agreement did not purport to limit defendant's liability. Rather it provided an additional remedy for plaintiff.
Defendant's testimony as to her concern over her liability,
if she could not complete performance of the contract,
indicates that she knew that one who enters a contract may
be liable in damages for its breach. The trial court could
reasonably conclude that since defendant had such knowledge
she did not enter. into the contract under the mil!$6ken belief
that the clause giving an optional remedy to plaintiff also
limited defendant's liability.
[6] The trial court awarded damages based on a finding
that the value of the property to plaintiff under Civil Code,
section 3307,1 was equal to the resale price of $18,500. The resale took place approximately three months after the date
of defendant's breach, and it is undisputed that the value
of the property was declining during that period. Various
witnesses gave their opinions as to the value of the property
at the time of the breach, the lowest estimate being $22,500.
Although the resale price was evidence of the value of the
property to plaintiff at the time of the resale (Bagdasarian v.
Gragnon, 31 Cal.2d 744, 757-758 [192 P.2d 935]), the trial
court's failure to make an adjustment for the admitted decline in the market was erroneous, unless the damages are to
be computed as of the date of resale rather than as of the date
of the breach. Plaintiff contends that under Civil Code, section 3353,11 it was proper for the trial court to determine the
value as of the later date.
1"The detriment caused by the breach of an agreement to purchase
an estate in real property, is deemed to be the excess, if any, of the
amount which would have been due to the seller, under the contract,
~ver the value of the property to him."
"'In estimating damages, the value of property to a seller thereof
is deemed to be the price which he could have obtained therefor in the
market nearest to the place at which it should have been accepted by
the buyer, and at such time after the breach of the contract as would
have au1liced, with reasonable ~ence. for the lIeller to e1feet & resaIe."

.
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Under the provisions of section 3353 the value of the prop·
erty is to be determined, not as of the date of the breach of
the contract, but as of such time thereafter I I as would have
sufficed, with reasonable diligence, for the seller to effect a
resale." Defendant contends, however, that the reference to
"the market nearest to the place at which [the property]
should have been accepted" makes clear that the section was
intended to apply only to sales of personal property.
The language defendant relies upon is apposite to contracts for the sale of personal property. It sets forth the
elements of performance of such contracts, and indicates a
physical change of possession at a particular place. Such
language does not describe any of the duties of a vendee of
an estate in real property. At most such a vendee is obliged
to accept a conveyance; he need not take possession of the
property itself. Similarly the reference to the nearest market
indicates concern with personal rather than rea] property.
The seller must deliver the property to a certain place, and
if the buyer refuses to accept it the seller may then dispose
of it in the nearest market. Thus the language of the statute
itself suggests that it is limited to sales of personal property.
Before the adoption of the Uniform Sales .Act ( Civ. Code,
§ 1721 e't seq.) in ] 931, section 3353 was invoked by the courts
to define the term "value to the seller" as used in former
Civil Code, section 3311, which stated the measure of damages
for breach of an agreement to accept and pay for personal
property. (See, e. g., H~"ll v. McKay, 94 Cal. 5. 17-18 [29 P.
406].) [7] In cases involving sales of real property, however, it has generally been held that the value of the property
to the seller is to be determined as of the date of the breach.
(Drew v. Pedlar, 87 Cal. 443, 450-451 [25 P. 749, 22 Am.St.
Rep. 257] ; Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Ca1.2d 36, 39-40 [2]6 P.2d
13]; Dean v. Hawes, 21 Cal.App. 350, 355 [131 P. 8851;
Shurtleff v. Marcus Land etc. 00., 59 Cal.App. 520, 523
[211 P. 244] ; Oaspar Lumber 00. v. Stowell, 37 Ca1.App.2d
58,61 [98 P.2d 744] ; Employees' Participating Assn. v. Pine,
91 Cal.App.2d 299, 301 [204 P.2d 965] ; see,also, McCormick
on Damages, § 186, pp. 710-711; anno., 52 A.L.R. 1511, 1512.)
Thus the rule that has been consistently followed in determining the damages for breach of an agreement to purchase an estate in real property is inconsistent with the provisions of section 3353. Although its applicability in such cases
has apparently never been directly ad:il1dicated. the fact that
it was regularly invoked in cases involving personal property
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convinces us that it was not considered in real property cases
because it was regarded as inapplicable, not because it was
overlooked. [8] We conclude that section 3353 has no application to sales of real property, and that the damages should
therefore be computed as of the date of the breach of the agreement to purchase the property.
Defendant contends that the trial court also erred in allowing as additional damages $45 in escrow charges, $40 in title
charges, and $420 in broker's fees paid in connection with the
first sale. [9] When, as under section 3307, the measure
of damages is designed to assure to the vendor the benefit
of his bargain, additional damages should not be allowed for
expenses that would have been incurred had the contract
been performed. To do so would place the vendor in a better
position than he would have been in had there been no breach.
(Civ. Code, § 3358.) Thus, plaintiff would have paid the
'}xpenses from the proceeds of the sale had the contract been
performed. If she is given the equivalent of the .proceeds. of
the sale under section 3307 she is not also entitled to expenses
that she would have incurred in any event.
[10] In many cases, however, the vendee's breach may
make it necessary for the vendor to incur additional expenses
to realize the benefit of his bargain. Given the rule that the
value of the property to the seller under section 3307 is ordinarily thc market value at the time of the breach (Employees'
Participating Assn. v. Pine, 91 Cal.App.2d 299, 301 [204 P.2d
965], and cases cited), injustice could result if the vendor
were not allowed to recover damages for additional expenses
caused him by the vendee's breach. Thus in a case where the
property is sold at the market value and that value remains
constant until after the breach, and the property is then
resold at the same price, the vendor could recover no damages
under section 3307. He would be forced to pay, however, in
addition to the expenses of the first sale, the expenses of the
resale. When such additional expenses are the natural consequence of the breach, they may be recovered in addition to
those provided for in section 3307. (Yocum v. Taylor, 50
Cal.App. 294, 295 [195 P. 62] ; accord, King v. Globe Grain
etc. Co., 58 Cal.App. 105, 114 [208 P. 166], adopting same rule
with respect to former Civil Code, section 3311 ; see 5 Corbin
on Contracts, § 1036, p. 186.) The statements in Morgan v.
Dibble, 43 Cal.App. 116 [184 P. 704]. and Maloney v. H ou.~ton,
51 Cal.App. 585 [197 P. 661], indicating that section 3307
provides the exclusive measure of damages were not nee-
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essary to the decisions ill thmw cases and are disapproved.
[11] It does not follow that the actual expenses of the
first sale will necessarily be equal to the additional expenses
caused by the vendee's breach. If all of the contemplated
expenses of the first sale are actually paid and the property
does not change in value, ordinarily the additional expense
of reselling made necessary by the breach will be equal to
those incurred in the first sale. In the present case, however,
it appears that all the contemplated expenses of the first sale
were not paid and that the cost of reselling at the market value
at the time of the breach would have been less than the cost of
selling at the contract price. Under the terms of her agreement with the broker plaintiff was not obligated to pay the
full commission on the first sale in case of defendant's default.
She paid only $420, thus saving $780 of the anticipated expense of the first sale.
Since the cost of a sale under the usual brokerage contract is 5 per cent of the purchase price, what that cost
would have been at the time of defendant's breach cannot be
determined in the .9bsence of a finding of the market value of
the property at that time. On retrial, the trial eourt, in com·
puting the additional damages caused by defendant's breach,
should allow an amount equal to the difference between the
cost of selling the property at its value at the time of the
breach and $780, the amount the anticipated expenses of the
first sale were reduced by defendant's default.
[12] In fixing the damages on the basis of the resale price,
the trial court failed to make a deduction for the value of
certain personal property included in the first sale but not
in the second. On retrial the value of the personal property
agreed to be sold with the realty should be taken into consideration.
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed to
retry only the issue of damages in accordance with the views
expressed herein. Each party is to bear her own costs on this
appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J.,
concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I eoncur in the judgment and generally in
Justice Traynor's opinion. In so doing, however, I deem it
proper to note that I consider the resale price obtained by
plaintiff as constituting some evidence of the value of the
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property to her on the date of the breach. The fact that there
,vas a falling market on and following that date must be considered in connection with the price finally obtained in order
to estimate the value as of the date of breach, but that fact
also must be considered as affecting the price reasonably
obtainable by a seller who first learns on the date of breach
that a new purchaser must be obtained.
In other words, an appraiser in estimating, and a court in
finding, the value to the seller on the date of breach must
necessarily take into consideration the fact that some appreciable time is ordinarily required to find a purchaser ready,
able and willing to buy. The value to the seller on the date
of breach should be the price obtainable on an offering of the
property on that date with allowance for a reasonable time
within which to find a purchaser. Certainly the seller who
does not breach his contract should not have to anticipate
a breach by the contracting purchaser nor should such a seller
ha"e to stand all or any part of the loss nec~ri1y flowing
from the purchaser's breach. Thus, if the price finally obtained in a falling market is the best price which reasonably
couJd be procured, with due diligence, on an offering made as
of the date of breach, the value to the seller as of such date
would be no more than the price actually obtained.

